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IF THERE BE A CRISIS, HOW SHALL WE KNOW IT?
MICHAELJ. SAKS*
Legal policy-making often goes on in grand indifference to-
and occasionally even in defiance of-available relevant empirical
evidence. That is no revelation, of course, and the litigation explo-
sion appears to provide one more excellent illustration of the point.
If we are to understand and solve such problems, it will help us to
have them accurately described, to have theory and data to assist us
in attributing the problems to their true causes, and to implement
and test proposed solutions with an empiricist's curiosity rather
than a reformer's zeal. I will explain why I think Professor Ga-
lanter's articleI both contributes to this effort and distracts us from
it. I will also address an issue he does no more than touch upon, but
which may be the most interesting and important question of all:
why does legal policy-making so often proceed without regard to
available evidence on the matter? Or, to echo the realist theme,
what is really going on here?
I. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF THE PROBLEM AND ITS CAUSES
One of the most important aspects of this as well as related ear-
lier articles by Professor Galanter and his colleagues' is that they
inquire into the degree to which relevant empirical evidence sup-
ports the claims made concerning a litigation explosion, and they
share with us the findings of that inquiry. The explosion appears to
be more rhetorical than real.
Those offering wholesale condemnation of our civil justice sys-
tem, and counseling a variety of reforms ranging from tinkering to
Visiting Professor, University of Iowa College of Law. B.A., B.S., Pennsylvania
State University, 1969; M.A., 1972; Ph.D., Ohio State University, 1975; M.S.L., Yale Law
School, 1983. Co-author with R. HASTIE, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY IN COURT (1978). The
author wishes to thank several of his Iowa colleagues for their criticisms and sugges-
tions: David Baldus, Steven Burton, John Reitz, and Serena Stier.
1. Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3 (1986).
2. E.g., Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know
(And Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4
(1983).
3. E.g., Trubek, Sarat, Felstiner, Kritzer & Grossman, The Costs of Ordinary Litigation,
31 UCLA L. REV. 72 (1983) (analyzing empirical evidence for proposition that costs of
litigation are rising and that these costs are an important public problem) [hereinafter
Trubek].
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radical alteration, are confident they know a serious problem exists
and, what is more, they know its causes.4 Their language is so strong
and so clear that one hesitates to doubt the accuracy of their vision.
But in support of their views, they generally offer little more than
unsupported assertions or anecdotes, examples of which Professor
Galanter has cited. Mere assertion is simply that, and repeating
something often or enlarging the chorus does not make it any more
true.
As I have noted elsewhere,5 government by anecdote is a bad
idea not because the anecdotes are untrue or are not evidence
(though sometimes they are untrue and therefore are not evi-
dence),6 but because they contribute so little to developing a clear
picture of the situation we are concerned about. It makes a differ-
ence if for every ten anecdotes in which an undeserving plaintiff
bankrupts an innocent defendant, zero, ten, one hundred, one thou-
sand, or ten thousand equal and opposite injustices were done to
deserving and innocent plaintiffs.7 The proportion of cases that re-
sults in some sort of error,8 and the ratio of one kind of error to the
other, ought to be of greater interest to a serious policy-maker than
a handful of anecdotes on either side of an issue. After all, the re-
forms to be adopted are intended to change that ratio and the tens
of thousands of anecdotes it summarizes.
This brings us, then, to the kind of information that should
form the core of the debate: data. If the explosion is real and the
4. See, e.g., those quoted in Galanter, supra note 1, at notes 1-10 and accompanying
text.
5. Saks, In Search of "The Lawsuit Crisis, " 14(2) L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 77 (1986).
6. I know that lawyers, for whom evidence is evidence whether it is true or false, will
find this to be a strange construction. But the rest of humanity, not only social science
empiricists, will instantly understand what I mean here.
7. The rhetoric of the liability crisis would have us believe that our tort system fre-
quently rewards plaintiffs without valid claims. Nothing is said about the obverse error,
i.e., the failure of our tort system to compensate plaintiffs with valid claims. We do not
in fact know the magnitude of this obverse error, but as we will see, infra pp. 69-72, there
is evidence it is very great.
8. What is an error? This is obviously a difficult question. Arguably, the "real"
merits of most, if not all, claims are subject to dispute and are not knowable with cer-
tainty. For present purposes, however, it is sufficient to rely on what may reasonably be
predicted to be the outcome of a fair trial as the ultimate test of a claim's merit. Our
civil justice system, by this definition, generates error when a meritorious claim (i.e., one
that would, if fairly tried, win a verdict and damages) is never pursued at all or if brought
to court does not prevail or is settled for less than its potential fair-trial damages award.
An erroneous result is also generated when an unmeritorious claim is pursued and wins
a verdict and damages, or is settled for any amount, or imposes defense costs on an
innocent defendant. Obviously, data compiled in accordance with these concepts of er-
ror are not readily available.
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crisis serious, it should not be difficult to find data confirming those
fears. In this regard, Professor Galanter makes two important con-
tributions to the liability crisis debate. He summarizes some impor-
tant data, and he helps us to think about what they mean.
Conscientious policy-makers will be interested to learn that
98% of civil litigation goes on in state courts, that those filings have
declined in the past several years, and that even tort filings have in-
creased only 1% more than population growth.9 Those urging re-
form, when they do point to data, usually point to the 2% of
litigation that is handled by federal courts. Professor Galanter helps
us to interpret the meaning of those federal data,"0 which show a
123% increase in filings over the past decade.
First of all, he notes that an increase in filings is not necessarily
a reflection of an increase in plaintiffs' "litigiousness." Changes in
filing rates are equally a reflection of defendants' resistance to
resolving disputes short of litigation. The filing rate reflects, as well,
the volume of transactions, the number of actionable injuries result-
ing from those transactions, lawyers' case-screening practices, and,
no doubt, numerous other variables." Any real understanding of
what is going on requires knowing what lies behind and gives rise to
any change (or stability) in filing rates.
Moreover, Professor Galanter shows us that the 123% increase
9. Galanter, supra note 1, at 6. Lest we think that legislative ignorance about basic
legislative facts is limited to the area of tort reform, consider the following. A survey of
Wyoming state legislators found that they believed the insanity defense was invoked 44
times as often as it actually was and succeeded 3000 times as often as it actually did.
Pasewark & Pasewark, The Insanity Plea: Much Ado About Little, in PSYCHIATRIC PATIENT
RIGHTS AND PATIENT ADVOCACY: ISSUES AND EVIDENCE 101, 116 (B. Bloom & S. Asher
eds. 1982).
10. Professor Galanter points out that in the context of litigation rates the statistical
"facts" can never stand without a theory: "In discussions of policy, figures like litigation
rates are theories .... " Galanter, supra note 1, at 15. (I would go further, and argue that
this is true of all data.) In practical terms, this admonition means that data cannot be
taken at face value. The definitions and assumptions and methods and context that give
rise to the data must be thought through. Professor Galanter does a careful job helping
us to think about what the numbers may mean.
11. It is interesting to consider what key factors might compose a model of what
drives variations in litigation rates: population, number or complexity of human transac-
tions, etc. Even with a steady population, increasing the number of times people do
business with or drive past each other is likely to give rise to increasing numbers of
disputes and consequential suits. Population itself may provide only a crude statistical
control. Productivity, or perhaps sheer activity, probably would come closer to control-
ling for the social changes that drive litigation. Consider the relations between doctors
and patients. If, as a result of new treatments, new ways of delivering health care, new
forms of payment, and other efficiencies, doctors are able to have more contacts with
patients per unit time, the result should not only be more health care delivered and
more fees earned, but simultaneously more injuries, more disputes, and more lawsuits.
1986]
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means something other than appears at first blush. By disaggregat-
ing those cases into the categories supplied by the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts, Professor Galanter finds that it is
the federal government itself that has added by far the largest frac-
tion of the increase in litigation, having increased its filings (of over-
payment recoveries) by 6,683%! 12 Except for products liability (of
which one-fourth were asbestos claims, now waning), the federal
caseload for tort cases has been fairly stable.
These are but a few illustrations of the way Professor Galanter,
and other empirically oriented legal scholars, force us to deal with
the evidence of the world we propose to reshape through law re-
form. We need not limit policy debates to a mutually uninformative
swapping of anecdotes or a heated exchange of quotations. In my
view, it is enormously helpful to inform ourselves about our world
empirically, and to think intelligently about the alternative interpre-
tations of the relevant empirical data."3
That the topographic map of vociferous reformers is not consis-
tent with the most fundamental features of the landscape over which
they presume to reign should give us all pause. If their assessment
of our condition-the easiest part of problem-solving-can be so in-
consistent with the evidence, we might well be hesitant to accept
their diagnosis of causes and their prescribed treatment.
II. BuT WHAT IS "THE PROBLEM"?
In showing that there has been no general litigation explosion
to speak of, has Professor Galanter shown that there is no problem?
That depends upon what problem we are worried about. The insur-
ance industry, most notably, has been telling the public and our leg-
islators that there is a liability insurance crisis and that its cause, inter
alia, is a litigation explosion. 14 Professor Galanter makes a strong
case that, if nothing else, the liability crisis cannot be due to a litiga-
12. Galanter, supra note 1, at 16 & 23 Tables 2 & 3. Pursuant to the Comprehensive
Crime Control Act of 1984, the advent of the United States Sentencing Commission,
sentencing guidelines, the abolition of parole, and the right to appeal sentences will, I
am sure, provide another government-induced boost in the amount of litigation in the
federal courts.
13. "[T]here is no substitute for patient attendance to the empirical facts of life, and no
substitute for systematic reasoning about them." P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 10 (10th
ed. 1976) (emphasis in original).
14. See, e.g., INSURANCE INFORMATION INST., THE LAWSUIT CRISIS 2 (Apr. 1986)
("[T]he number of personal injury, product liability or property damage suits ... has
created a crisis .... "). The insurance industry is making its views known, among other
ways, through a $6.5 million advertising campaign. The Manufactured Crisis, 51 CoN-
SUMER REP. 544, 545 (Aug. 1986).
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tion explosion because there is none. But finding out that the liabil-
ity problem has been attributed to the wrong causes does not make
it go away.
The liability problem remains. Insurance premiums have been go-
ing up, coverage is becoming harder to find, and the insurance in-
dustry appears to have lost money, at least in some years.' 5 The
industry officials and legislators quoted in Professor Galanter's arti-
cle complain about rising costs and threats to industry at least as
much as they accuse the average American of causing the problem
by being so litigious. The problems of unavailable or too-costly in-
surance are no less real, and require analysis and solution. They
may not be due to an increase in litigation rates, but they are due to
something, be it increasing unpredictability in jury awards,1 6 stock
market fluctuation, interest rate declines, mismanagement, collu-
sion, or whatever.
Burdens on the civil justice system remain. The civil justice system
suffers increased demands from the growth in cases, even if the
growth is exactly proportional to population. Even absolute growth
puts increasing demands on the system to handle the new busi-
ness--demands that are not being met by enlarged judicial re-
sources, and perhaps cannot be.' 7 As we see from Galanter's Table
4, caseloads have been increasing faster than judgeships. 8
Serious flaws in the tort system remain. The final judgment of the
tort system may be that it is an unacceptably imperfect way to
achieve the goals we have set for it. It is, in several senses, an ineffi-
cient means for allocating resources to injured people. It is uneven
in its ability to compensate: a relatively few plaintiffs strike it rich in
the tort lottery; a much larger proportion of injured people obtain
inadequate compensation or none at all.9 And the transaction costs
15. These numbers are difficult to pin down. While the liability insurance industry
experienced underwriting losses of $21.5 billion in 1984 and $24.7 billion in 1985, it
made a profit in the former but not in the latter year. The Manufactured Crisis, supra note
14, at 544. In many years it pays out more in claims and expenses than it takes in premi-
ums. Whether it makes a profit or not depends upon how successfully it invests the
money between the time the premiums are received and the claims are paid. When
investment opportunities are good, the industry can lower its premiums, have larger
underwriting losses, and make larger profits.
16. See discussion, infra pp. 75-76, on the increase in unpredictability and its causes.
17. Merely adding judgeships may not solve all of the problems of even a flat per
capita caseload. The system may suffer from inefficiencies of scale, routinization, poor
management, poor case handling, poor quality of justice, and so on. Even without a
crisis, reform ofjudicial administration may be necessary.
18. To be precise, 122.9% vs. 29.2%. Galanter, supra note 1, at 6 & 26 Tables 1 & 4.
19. See D. HARRIS, M. MACLEAN, H. GENN, S. LLOYD-BOSTOCK, P. FENN, P. CORFIELD
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are enormous: a small portion of the total expense of the tort system
winds up compensating injured plaintiffs; a large portion is spent on
insurers, shareholders, lawyers, experts, and courts.2 °
In short, while "litigiousness"-judging from the data-does
not appear to be a problem for society, problems involving the lia-
bility system do remain. We do not know nearly enough about them
or their causes, or what to do to improve matters. Is such a system
worth what society has to pay for it? Does it provide the best mix of
goal attainment-cost-spreading, deterrence, minimizing safety
costs, minimizing injury costs, redistribution-that can be achieved?
III. How Do WE Go ABOUT EVALUATING THE TORT SYSTEM?
Professor Galanter suggests that one needs to view the civil jus-
tice system in a fairly complex way, that its effects on both litigants
(through specific deterrence and law-controlled wealth transfers)
and on others arranging their lives in the shadow of the law (general
deterrence) need to be assessed as part of any discussion of whether
on balance the tort system is working well-and, more to the point,
working better than the alternatives being proposed for it. I
agree.2 '
But we cannot evaluate any system if we are not in agreement
about what its goals really are, and the goals of tort law are not with-
out some controversy. What we might do is ask, and try to obtain
empirical answers, about the degree to which the tort system is
achieving a number of its possible goals. If it is a deterrence system,
& Y. BRITTAN, COMPENSATION AND SUPPORT FOR ILLNESS AND INJURY (1984) [hereinafter
HARRIS]. This comprehensive empirical study, which found that only a small minority-
12%--of all accident victims initiate legal claims and obtain damages for their losses, id.
at 317, was based on British data. Given significant differences between the British tort
system and our own, these results cannot be extrapolated without qualification; but,
given the underlying similarities of the two systems, the results point to serious flaws in
both systems. See generally Abel, £'s of Cure, Ounces of Prevention (Book Review), 73 CALIF.
L. REV. 1003 (1985) (reviewing HARRIS and also discussing relevant American research).
But see Kornhauser, Theory and Fact in the Law of Accidents (Book Review), 73 CALIF. L. REV.
1024, 1029 (1985) (arguing that several factors suggest the American tort system pro-
vides more compensation than does the British system).
20. For example, a study by the Rand Corporation's Institute for Civil Justice found
that of every dollar paid out in asbestos claims, an average of 62 cents went to attorney's
fees and litigation expenses. See REPORT OF THE TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP ON THE
CAUSES, EXTENT AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT CRISIS IN INSURANCE AVAILA-
BILITY AND AFFORDABILITY 42 (Feb. 1986) (citingJ. KAKALIK, P. EBENER, W. FELSTINER,
G. HAGGSTROM & M. SHANLEY, VARIATIONS IN ASBESTOS LITIGATION COMPENSATION AND
EXPENSES xviii (1984)).
21. Melton & Saks, The Law as an Instrument of Socialization and Social Control, 33 NEB.
SYMP. ON MOTIVATION 235 (1985).
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how well is it deterring? If it is a compensation system, how well is it
compensating? If it is a cost-spreading system, how well is it spread-
ing costs?
Suppose we wanted to evaluate the extent to which the tort sys-
tem is compensating injured persons, doing so with a measure of
efficiency, while creating an effective deterrent. One aspect of such
an inquiry might look to the correspondence between the incidence
of actionable injuries and the compensation awarded to the victims.
Those with a valid claim to compensation under the substantive
rules of tort law should win compensation if they seek it, and those
without a valid claim should not. A system that brought about large
transfers from defendants who were not liable under the law (false
positive errors by the system) would not be desirable. And a system
that failed to compensate plaintiffs who had been injured by defend-
ants whose actions breached the requisite duty of care (false nega-
tive errors) would also not be desirable.
This question asks not only whether juries and judges make the
right decisions on individual cases. It asks more generally whether
the larger system provides adequate opportunities for injured plain-
tiffs to recover-or whether instead it errs in the ways noted above:
false positive and false negative errors at the system level. These
errors might have an unfavorable impact on the deterrent function
of tort law by reducing its real and perceived accuracy, either by
deterring conduct that is desirable or by failing to deter conduct
that is undesirable. These errors would also reduce the perception
of the institution's ability to do justice. And, clearly, such errors
represent failure as a compensator.
While I am aware of no adequate data on the ratio of false posi-
tive (invalid claims granted) to false negative errors (valid claims un-
compensated), the system does appear to contain a large percentage
of false negatives.22 That is an ironic finding in the face of the cur-
rent uproar, which would lead us to believe that the system's major
difficulty involves rewarding frivolous claims. The reverse may well
be the more serious problem.
Take the area of medical malpractice. Insurers, physicians, and
22. See, e.g., Danzon, An Economic Analysis of the Medical Malpractice System, 1 (1) BEHAV-
IORAL SCI. & L. 39, 42 (1983) ("[R]oughly one in 25 patients injured as a result of negli-
gent care receives compensation through the malpractice system .... ); J. LADINSKY &
C. SUSMILCH, COMMUNITY FACTORS IN THE BROKERAGE OF CONSUMER PRODUCT AND SER-
VICE PROBLEMS 12-13 (Univ. of Wisc. Disputes Processing Research Program Working
Paper 1983-14, 1983) (one-quarter of consumer product complaints surveyed were not
pursued; roughly one-third of claims pursued were unsuccessful or only partially
successful).
1986]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
hospitals believe that the rise in filings2 3 means the system in gen-
eral has gone "berserk ' 24 and that the increased proportion ofjudg-
ments for plaintiffs25 plus larger awards 26 means that juries in
particular have gone crazy.27 An alternative assessment is that these
changes represent modest adjustments in a system that continues to
provide substantial (if not excessive) protection for defendants. Nu-
merous studies in the medical literature show a far greater incidence
of medical errors than are ever called to account through a law-
suit. 28 For example, a review of patient records in California hospi-
tals found that 1 in every 126 patients suffered iatrogenic injuries
for which compensation could be awarded under existing law. 29 But
fewer than one-tenth of those potential plaintiffs sought any com-
pensation.30 "Lumping it" seems to be the preferred style of dis-
pute resolution-quite a different picture from that being painted
for the public."'
23. What kind of evidence permits a conclusion that there has been "a rise in mal-
practice filings"? If there are more filings per capita at Time 2 than at Time], does that
reveal greater litigiousness toward physicians and hospitals? Or should it be more fil-
ings per patient? Or more filings per doctor-patient transaction? If people are receiving
more medical care more often, commensurately more injuries and more suits will occur.
What kind of evidence will tell us in some meaningful sense that filings are "up"?
24. AEtna advertisement, Wall St. J., Apr. 8, 1986, at 9, col. 1.
25. M. PETERSON & G. PRIEST, THE CIVIL JURY: TRENDS IN TRIALS AND VERDICTS,
COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS, 1960-1979, viii (Inst. for Civil Justice, Rand Corp. 1982).
26. See discussion, infra pp. 72-74, concerning the difficulties of determining
whether or not there are "larger awards."
27. Or at least are among those having a "mad romance" with the civil litigation
process. 132 CONG. REC. S948 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1986) (statement of Sen. McConnell,
made on previous day).
28. See, e.g., Gilbert, Light & Mosteller, Assessing Social Innovations: An Empirical Base
for Policy, in STATISTICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 185, 211-12 (Fairley & Mosteller eds. 1977)
(eight of twelve surgical innovations studied were either harmful or had on balance no
positive effect); A. Benedict, Regulation of Professional Behavior: (Mis)Use of Elec-
troconvulsive Therapy 59-62 (Ph.D. dissertation, Boston College 1985) (ninety percent
of the administrations of ECT in Massachusetts violate one or more major aspects of the
profession's standards for the treatment).
29. Danzon, supra note 22, at 42 (citing CAL. MED. Ass'N & CAL. Hosp. Ass'N, MEDI-
CAL INSURANCE FEASIBILITY STUDY (1977)).
30. Danzon, supra note 22, at 42, links data from CAL. MED. Ass'N with data from
NAT'L ASS'N INS. COMM'RS, MALPRACTICE CLAIMS (1980), to infer the rate of injuries per
malpractice claim in California hospitals.
31. Any real increase in malpractice cases may be attributable to a number of
changes in law and in society. Some of the long-standing special protections enjoyed by
malpractice defendants have been removed, among them the abolition of the locality
rule and the charitable immunity doctrine. Changes in the structure of medical practice
may leave patients less fond of their doctors (and therefore less forgiving of errors), or
may have increased the number and potency of doctor-patient contacts, which would
increase the opportunities for malpractice to occur even as it increases the opportunities
for health benefits to occur. Changes in society may have produced patients who are
[VOL. 46:63
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From this viewpoint, the tort system creates barriers for people
who have a valid claim to compensation. It protects defendants
from having to internalize more than a fraction of the costs they
create. This perspective might view the tort system as too passive,
too favorable to defendants, and as one whose errors favor defend-
ants by too great a margin. If a good tort system is one that, among
other things, fosters a close correlation between actionable injuries
and compensation awarded, then our present system might be
judged to be doing far less well than it might. At the same time, this
highly skewed rate of errors might contribute to its failure to pro-
vide the necessary level of deterrence.32
If these were the shortcomings of the tort system with which
reformers concerned themselves, different sorts of reforms would
be called for. Instead of trying to make bringing suits more difficult
or reducing the incentives to sue, concern would focus on ways to
improve the correspondence between compensable injuries and
awards.33
better informed than in the past. All these possible causes of altered malpractice litiga-
tion rates merit inquiry.
Moreover, because cases involving complex litigation generally are difficult and ex-
pensive to prepare, an unusually large fraction of them probably are screened out by
attorneys. It makes no economic sense for an attorney to take such a case unless the
value of the injury is well over three times the cost of preparing the case. See, e.g., Cof-
fee, The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareholder Litigation, 48(3) LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (1985) (arguing that a plaintiff's incentives in shareholder litigation
differ from those of plaintiff's counsel, so that until the value of plaintiff's injury exceeds
a certain level, counsel has no incentive to take the case). This gives defendants virtual
impunity to injure people in an amount up to three times the cost of preparing a plain-
tiff's case. In technical and complicated cases such as medical malpractice, toxic torts,
and products liability, this will create a large fraction of potential plaintiffs who have no
chance of pursuing recovery.
Of malpractice cases that do go to a jury, a smaller fraction is decided for plaintiffs
than is true in any other category of litigation. See M. PETERSON & G. PRIEST, supra note
25, at 19, Table 3 (data from Cook County, Illinois). That the probability of a finding
for the plaintiff is small may say that the claims often are without merit, or that juries
continue to give doctors and hospitals a large benefit of the doubt. That the fraction of
plaintiff verdicts is increasing, id. at 17, may reflect changes injury attitudes, or changes
in the pool of cases being brought to attorneys, or changes in attorney screening of
cases, or changes in the quality of case preparation and presentation. Again, all of these
possibilities would be well worth studying if we wanted to know what was really going
on.
32. Or, to express this proposition in different terms, the errors may lead to an unec-
onomic under-allocation of social resources to injury prevention. See generally G. CALA-
BRESI, THE COSTS OF AccIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970) (discussing
tort law in terms of economic principles); Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STuD.
29 (1972) (same).
33. A simple reform might be to increase the availability of relevant information by
requiring that copies of medical records, especially pathology reports, be sent routinely
19861
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It may be, however, that notwithstanding these errors the sys-
tem as now structured may not be able to do better and still survive.
Perhaps the current tort system is so cumbersome and has such
huge transaction costs that it works only if few injured people make
use of it and those few receive damages that far exceed their real
need for compensation.34 A few extreme awards may total a fraction
of the real costs of injury, while looming so large in the public mind
that they serve a deterrent function out of proportion to the real
costs extracted from defendants and their insurers. Such a system
would, also, appear to the public to be unfair to (some few) defend-
ants, while the larger systemic unfairness to plaintiffs (false nega-
tives) remains invisible.35 These suggest interesting questions to
which we do not know the answers.
IV. MONEY
One of the most important issues not addressed in this particu-
lar article by Professor Galanter (but certainly studied by him and
his colleagues previously36 ) is that of cost. Are those protesting the
current tort system really concerned about the litigiousness of the
American people or how busy the courts are? I think they have
made plain that what really concerns them is that the present ar-
rangement may be costing them more money than they can afford.
A look back at the quotations included in Professor Galanter's arti-
cle will reveal few critics whose focus is not on distributional con-
cerns. Like so many other issues in this life, the real heart of the
present crisis may be money.
Do we know as much about these cost issues as we do about
filings, trials, settlements, and so on? I think not. Are awards up in
real terms? If so, why? We know that insurance premiums are ris-
to patients or to their lawyers. Or we might think about abolishing the system of private
enforcement altogether in favor of some alternative that was better able to identify inju-
ries, compensate the injured, and correct harmful patterns of practice by injurers.
34. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 170 (2d ed. 1977), argues that just such
an arrangement might constitute an efficient deterrence scheme for the criminal law.
35. Among the many cognitive heuristics that guide human thinking is the "availabil-
ity heuristic." Research on this shows that people erroneously estimate the frequency of
occurrence of some event to be proportional to the ease with which they can retrieve
from memory instances of the event. Saks & Kidd, Human Information Processing and Adju-
dication: Trial by Heuristics, 15 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 123 (1980-81). Thus, a few shocking
instances of some event (such as an outrageous jury award) will be readily available to
memory and its frequency will be overestimated. Events in the larger class, uncompen-
sated injuries, are really system nonevents, and are unavailable to memory (or to news-
papers) and will be thought to occur infrequently or not at all.
36. See, e.g., supra notes 2 & 3.
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ing precipitously, but the reasons for this are a matter of contro-
versy.37 What is the impact of these awards on the willingness of
parties to settle, on deterrence, and on the panoply of other things
we want a good system of liability to accomplish? Let me take us
through what should be the simplest of questions in order to
demonstrate how elusive the answers might be.
Are jury awards up? Total costs to defendants certainly are up,
if only because population and absolute numbers of cases are up.
Similarly, the number of unusually high awards is likely to be up,
again if only because the total caseload has grown with the popula-
tion. From the viewpoint of defendants, this is exacerbated by any
rise in the proportion of verdicts favoring plaintiffs 8 and the impact
that change has on settlements.
But if, more sensibly, we ask about the median jury award, as
representative of what juries are doing, and discover that it has been
rising over time, we have to ask carefully what that tells us. The only
adjustment most researchers think to make is for inflation.3 9 But
that is likely to be an underadjustment for a variety of reasons. If a
large fraction of damages is for the cost of medical care and rehabili-
tation, then awards are not rising if they merely track the rate of
health cost inflation.4" To the degree that medicine and other emer-
gency services have improved their ability to rescue people and pro-
long life, that may raise costs justifiably. To lost earnings and
medical expenses, defendants in more cases can now add the cost of
additional decades of round-the-clock care and rehabilitation. If in-
jured persons receive such treatment and live longer for having re-
ceived it, costs to defendants will understandably be greater. Ifjury
awards reflect such changes, they are not irrational or an-
tidefendant. Alternatively, changes in awards may reflect changes in
the mix of cases attorneys are bringing to court. If more people are
bringing their complaints to lawyers, and lawyers have a larger pool
of cases from which to choose, they would understandably select the
37. Other reasons for the insurance premium rise might include poor risk manage-
ment and a down cycle in the stock market or in interest rates. See Heydinger, Congress
Hears RIMS' Testimony on Insurance Availability, 33 RISK MGMT. 36, 40 (Apr. 1986).
38. The Rand Corporation data show a somewhat increased fraction of verdicts for
plaintiffs, at least in Cook County, Illinois. M. PETERSON & G. PRIEST, supra note 25, at
17.
39. See, e.g., id. at 20-21, Figures 6-8.
40. The Consumer Price Index for all goods and services rose 93% in the decade
from 1975 through 1984; for medical care it rose 125%. STATISTICAL ABSTRACTS OF THE
UNITED STATES 477, Table 795 (1986).
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larger ones.4 ' There are still other possibilities. Again, we do not
know which of them is a faithful reflection of what is happening.
Before altering the law to save defendants money, we need to
ascertain if changes in real terms have occurred, and if so what has
caused them. None of the possible causes mentioned above would
suggest the system has gone berserk. Even if an increase in average
awards reflects nothing more than jurors placing a higher value on
life and health than they once did, or on intangible hurts, we need to
think hard about whether this is undesirable.
Finally, the debate about cost reflects a normative debate that
has not been made as explicit as it should be. Many who object to
the current tort system are fond of noting that "we all pay."'4 2 That
is, in legally defined circumstances, the system transfers the cost of
injuries from plaintiffs to defendants, and through defendants the
cost is spread more widely. Is this a defect in the system or is it one
of its virtues? Before we change the system because "we all pay,"
we need to decide if cost-spreading continues to be a cultural value
preference or if the existing system is just on other grounds. Those
who criticize the tort system on this score are criticizing something
deeper than the current workings of the system. They seek funda-
mental change in our law's strategy for taking some of the sting out
of accidents.
V. WHAT IS REALLY GOING ON HERE?
Professor Galanter's article and my comments have addressed
mostly the problem of describing and explaining litigation behavior.
To develop a clear and accurate picture of this behavior is no simple
or unimportant matter. But what is perhaps even less simple and
more important is to understand why so large a gap exists between
the widespread perception that the American litigation system is
wildly out of control and the picture that emerges from an examina-
tion of the available evidence.43 Surely it is no small concern that
newspapers, legislators,44 lawyers, and the average person on the
street seem quite thoroughly convinced about some things that ap-
pear not to be true. Moreover, we must somehow square the appar-
4 1. This assumes there is not enough lawyer time to go around. Otherwise all cases
that offered a reasonable return on an attorney's investment of time would be accepted.
42. INSURANCE INFORMATION INST., supra note 14, at 2.
43. Professor Galanter devotes a few paragraphs toward the end of his article to
some hypotheses to explain this odd behavior.
44. See Forty Legislatures Act to Readjust Liability Rules, N.Y. Times, July 14, 1986, at 1,
col. 1.
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ently growing costs to insurers with the lack of a lawsuit crisis and
the very real possibility of no real dollar increase in awards.
This gap might be the product of an honest and innocent error,
which for some reason had sufficient plausibility to be widely ac-
cepted without much demand for evidence. The insurance liability
crisis does involve certain real events-rising insurance premiums
and cancellations. Perhaps these events have been attributed to an
incorrect cause, no matter how "obvious" the litigation explosion
may appear.
Another possibility, of course, is that the insurance crisis has
been manufactured by the insurance industry.45 Risky investments
or the vicissitudes of the market seem to play the largest part in
whether insurance companies make or lose money. 46 However much
the industry might wish to pass legislation guaranteeing high re-
turns on investments, that cannot be done. So one tries to change
what can be changed: tort law. If less money has to be paid out,
more is left to invest. If the public already is primed to believe that
the cause of the problem is too many unwarranted lawsuits, greedy
lawyers, crazy laws, and malingering plaintiffs, that can be used as
the theme of an advertising campaign.
It is also possible that underwriting decisionmaking in the in-
surance industry is somewhat out of control. Such decisionmaking
depends upon many unknowns (expected investment income, tax
law changes, inflation, expected claims, the competition's pricing,
etc.) and may not be handled in as statistically rational a way as pru-
dence dictates. In deciding how much in claims an insurer may be
liable for, and therefore how much to set aside in reserves, and
therefore how much to charge in premiums, insurers must engage in
statistical decisionmaking. They could rationally choose the mean of
the distribution of previous claims, adjusted for inflation or some
other increase. But if underwriters are frightened by increasing out-
lyers,48 or by increasing variability (unpredictability) injury awards,
they might choose a more extreme point from which to estimate fu-
ture costs. Such choices will make a dramatic difference in
premiums.
45. See The Manufactured Crisis, supra note 14.
46. During the insurance crisis of 1974, the industry lost $5 billion in underwriting
losses, but double that amount on its investments in common stocks alone. Danzon,
supra note 22, at 48-49.
47. See supra note 14.
48. Outlyers are the few cases that appear far above or far below the main body of a
frequency distribution.
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Some data do suggest that jury awards have grown increasingly
unpredictable. The liability crisis might in part be a misunderstand-
ing of the causes of, and an overreaction to, this increased variabil-
ity. Data on Cook County jury awards, for example, suggest that,
for at least some categories of litigation, since the mid-1970s the
ninetieth percentile ofjury awards has risen sharply while the tenth
percentile has fallen sharply. 49 That is, the variation in the distribu-
tion of awards has spread out, so that both larger and smaller
awards are more frequent than had been the case.50 Such an occur-
rence may surprise and frighten insurers. What could be causing
such a phenomenon? One important possibility was predicted by
researchers in the 1970s when the Supreme Court authorized and
many states adopted smaller juries in civil cases. Smaller sized ju-
ries, like any smaller samples, produce less stable and more variable
results than larger samples. While defendants and insurers may at-
tribute this growth in unpredictability to mysterious changes in the
minds of jurors, it may be due simply to a change in their num-
bers.5 1 If this is indeed the cause, we can expect it to level off at the
new magnitude of variability. If we decide it is harder to run a stable
tort system with such a degree of variability, that can be adjusted
easily enough. As the number ofjurors on a civil jury rises, the vari-
ability in awards will decline.52
"What-is-really-going-on-here?" is complicated by any number
of other themes and threads that help form the crisis tapestry. One
of them may be the tension between corporations and consumers. 53
Or part of the tapestry may be another version of the haves ob-
jecting to government enforced transfers to the have-nots-never
mind the antiquity of the justifications or the nonwelfare-state ori-
gins of the laws in question. Or it may be another variation on the
theme of hostility toward lawyers or law.
49. M. PETERSON & G. PRIEST, supra note 25, at 22-23.
50. The proponents of radical reform have--perhaps unknowingly, perhaps disin-
genuously-pointed only to a higher ceiling, when the floor has dropped as well.
51. To be precise, when the size of the jury is reduced by one-half (from 12 to 6), all
other things equal, the variability in its awards will increase by the square root of 2, or
1.41. That is, the variability in awards will increase by 41%. M. SAKS, JURY VERDICTS:
THE ROLE OF GROUP SIZE AND SOCIAL DECISION RULE 15, 34 n.1 (1977).
52. Zeisel ... And Then There Were None: The Diminution of the Federal Juty, 38 U. CHI.
L. REV. 710, 716-19 (1971).
53. The Rand Corporation's data reveal that the single greatest category of growth
in trials, at least in Cook County, Illinois, has been businesses suing businesses. M.
PETERSON & G. PRIEST, supra note 25, at 13-16. The complaints of growing litigiousness
have omitted mention of these offenders.
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VI. CONCLUSION
While I believe it is useful-indeed, essential-to have empiri-
cal evidence to inform us about the great variety of issues we face, I
wonder how such evidence can be effectively obtained and consid-
ered. How do myths such as the litigation "explosion" come into
being notwithstanding the evidence? How can we replace such
myths with more accurate and useful pictures of how our society and
our legal system function? And how do we keep ourselves from
damaging our society through the passion to fix things that we have
no good reason to believe are broken, while overlooking real
problems and real causes?
